Docker compose risk

What the provider says

Quoted from PayAI · source record · read 2026-10-27

---

Facts and where they come from

Price

0.001 USDC per call Provider claim

Recorded value: 0.001 USDC per call.

Unit

per call

Protocol

x402, REST · transport: HTTP Provider claim

Auth

x402

Endpoint

https://47-85-47-24.sslip.io/v1/docker-compose-risk

Source

PayAI · Public discovery API (provider-published records)

Last checked

Not checked by us yet — the data is as the source published it

First seen

2026-10-26

Payments and earnings

No settled payment on record. Earnings for this service are unknown — not zero.

Payment rails

A payment rail is where the provider asks to be paid. It is not proof that anything was paid through it. See evidence levels.

Input and output, as published

Request

{
    "type": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "queryParams": {
        "scenario": "privileged-control-plane"
    }
}

Response

{
    "type": "json",
    "example": {
        "label": "paid-demo:privileged-control-plane",
        "stats": {
            "volume_count": 0,
            "compose_bytes": 334,
            "network_count": 0,
            "service_count": 1,
            "tree_node_count": 19,
            "findings_by_severity": {
                "low": 2,
                "high": 6,
                "medium": 4,
                "critical": 4
            },
            "secret_definition_count": 0
        },
        "profile": "production",
        "summary": "BLOCK: 16 finding(s) across 1 service(s); 10 require resolution or explicit approval.",
        "verdict": "BLOCK",
        "coverage": {
            "mode": "static-parsed-docker-compose-json",
            "checks": [
                "privilege and namespace isolation",
                "capabilities and security profiles",
                "runtime user and read-only filesystem",
                "secret and environment handling",
                "published ports and host mounts",
                "image and build immutability",
                "resource limits, health, and logging",
                "external network and volume boundaries"
            ],
            "limitations": [
                "Accepts the caller's already parsed Compose JSON and does not resolve interpolation, profiles, includes, extends, anchors, or environment files.",
                "Does not inspect image metadata, layers, vulnerabilities, signatures, provenance, or Dockerfile contents.",
                "Does not verify host firewall rules, runtime defaults, secret-manager policy, external resource ownership, or the effective deployed model.",
                "Static findings do not replace docker compose config validation, image scanning, runtime policy, or a sandboxed deployment test."
            ],
            "builds_executed": false,
            "host_files_read": false,
            "environment_files_read": false,
            "secret_values_returned": false,
            "compose_project_started": false,
            "docker_daemon_contacted": false,
            "images_pulled_or_inspected": false
        },
        "findings": [
            {
                "code": "all_capabilities_added",
                "path": "services.control-plane.cap_add",
                "message": "The service adds all Linux capabilities.",
                "severity": "critical",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Drop all capabilities and add back only the minimum required set."
            },
            {
                "code": "literal_secret_environment",
                "path": "services.control-plane.environment",
                "message": "The service assigns 1 secret-like environment value(s); values are intentionally omitted.",
                "severity": "critical",
                "standard": "docker-compose-secrets",
                "remediation": "Use Compose secrets or an external secret manager and rotate any exposed value."
            },
            {
                "code": "privileged_container",
                "path": "services.control-plane.privileged",
                "message": "The service requests a privileged container with near-host-level runtime access.",
                "severity": "critical",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Remove privileged mode and grant only the exact devices and capabilities required."
            },
            {
                "code": "container_runtime_socket_mounted",
                "path": "services.control-plane.volumes[0]",
                "message": "A container runtime socket is mounted into the service, enabling control of the host daemon.",
                "severity": "critical",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-isolation",
                "remediation": "Remove the socket; use a narrowly scoped authenticated API or a rootless proxy if unavoidable."
            },
            {
                "code": "mutable_or_latest_image",
                "path": "services.control-plane.image",
                "message": "The runtime image is untagged or uses the mutable latest tag.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "software-supply-chain",
                "remediation": "Pin a trusted image by sha256 digest and automate reviewed digest updates."
            },
            {
                "code": "host_network_namespace",
                "path": "services.control-plane.network_mode",
                "message": "The service joins the host network namespace.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-isolation",
                "remediation": "Use an isolated container namespace and expose only the required interface."
            },
            {
                "code": "host_pid_namespace",
                "path": "services.control-plane.pid",
                "message": "The service joins the host PID namespace.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-isolation",
                "remediation": "Use an isolated container namespace and expose only the required interface."
            },
            {
                "code": "sensitive_port_publicly_bound",
                "path": "services.control-plane.ports[0]",
                "message": "A sensitive service port is published on all host interfaces.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "docker-network-exposure",
                "remediation": "Bind to an explicit trusted interface or place the service behind an authenticated proxy and firewall."
            },
            {
                "code": "seccomp_unconfined",
                "path": "services.control-plane.security_opt",
                "message": "The service disables Docker's default seccomp confinement.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-isolation",
                "remediation": "Use the default seccomp profile or a narrower reviewed profile."
            },
            {
                "code": "explicit_root_user",
                "path": "services.control-plane.user",
                "message": "The service explicitly runs as root.",
                "severity": "high",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Select a numeric non-root UID/GID and keep required files owned by that account."
            },
            {
                "code": "resource_limits_missing",
                "path": "services.control-plane.deploy.resources.limits",
                "message": "The production service has no visible CPU, memory, or process limit.",
                "severity": "medium",
                "standard": "container-resource-governance",
                "remediation": "Set bounded CPU, memory, and PID limits supported by the target Compose runtime."
            },
            {
                "code": "oom_killer_disabled",
                "path": "services.control-plane.oom_kill_disable",
                "message": "The service disables the kernel OOM killer and can threaten host availability.",
                "severity": "medium",
                "standard": "container-resource-governance",
                "remediation": "Keep OOM killing enabled and enforce an explicit memory limit."
            },
            {
                "code": "writable_root_filesystem",
                "path": "services.control-plane.read_only",
                "message": "The container root filesystem is not explicitly read-only.",
                "severity": "medium",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Set read_only: true and mount bounded writable tmpfs or volumes where required."
            },
            {
                "code": "no_new_privileges_missing",
                "path": "services.control-plane.security_opt",
                "message": "The service does not explicitly prevent acquisition of new privileges.",
                "severity": "medium",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Add security_opt: [no-new-privileges:true]."
            },
            {
                "code": "capabilities_not_dropped",
                "path": "services.control-plane.cap_drop",
                "message": "The service does not explicitly drop all default Linux capabilities.",
                "severity": "low",
                "standard": "docker-runtime-least-privilege",
                "remediation": "Set cap_drop: [ALL] and add back only capabilities proven necessary."
            },
            {
                "code": "healthcheck_missing_or_disabled",
                "path": "services.control-plane.healthcheck",
                "message": "The production service has no active Compose healthcheck.",
                "severity": "low",
                "standard": "container-operational-safety",
                "remediation": "Add a bounded healthcheck or document an equivalent external probe."
            }
        ],
        "services": [
            {
                "name": "control-plane",
                "image": "docker:latest",
                "index": 0,
                "user_mode": "explicit-root",
                "privileged": true,
                "ports_count": 1,
                "finding_count": 16,
                "volumes_count": 1,
                "build_configured": false,
                "secret_refs_count": 0,
                "image_immutability": "latest-or-untagged"
            }
        ],
        "risk_score": 100,
        "analysis_id": "compose-e78409dc107ac2d4b84b",
        "approval_gates": [
            "Resolve or explicitly approve 10 critical/high finding(s) before starting the Compose project.",
            "Confirm that no credential remains in Compose, environment files, process arguments, image history, or logs.",
            "Require a documented owner and expiration date for every host-access exception.",
            "Verify firewall, authentication, and intended interface binding for every published port."
        ],
        "analyzer_version": "composeguard-docker-compose/1.0"
    }
}

Examples are the provider's own, not a call we made.

Provenance

One row per statement. “Verified” means we checked it ourselves and the finding is quoted. “Provider claim” means we read it in the provider's own record. “Not found” is a statement about our search, not proof of absence.

Endpoint checks

We have not called this endpoint yet. Until we do, everything above is what the source published — no more.

Tags

---